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Family Bonding with Universities 
 
 
One justification offered for legacy admissions policies at universities is that that they 
bind entire families to the university. Proponents maintain that these policies have a number of 
benefits, including increased donations from members of these families. We use a rich set of data 
from an anonymous selective research institution to investigate which types of family members 
have the most important effect upon donative behavior. We find that the effects of attendance by 
members of the younger generation (children, children-in-law, nieces and nephews) are greater 
than the effects of attendance by older generations (parents, parents-in-law, aunts and uncles).  
Previous research has indicated that, in a variety of contexts, men and women differ in 
their altruistic behavior. However, we find that there are no statistically discernible differences 
between men and women in the way their donations depends on the alumni status of various 
types of relatives. Neither does the gender of the various types of relatives who attended the uni-
versity seem to matter. Thus, for example, the impact of having a son attend the university is no 
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 1. 
It is well-known that some universities give preferences to the children of alumni in the 
admissions process. In recent years, this practice has become increasingly controversial (Golden 
[2003] and Karabel [2005]). Many universities are quite open about the practice, and defend it in 
part because it helps bind entire families to their institutions. The President of the University of 
Pennsylvania, Amy Gutmann, articulated this view clearly: “We’re proactive about it because the 
alumni are an important part of the mix that sustains us over time…Our alumni are loyal to us, 
and we are loyal in return.” Gutmann was also careful to point out that legacy students must meet 
Penn’s academic standards: “No one gets a free pass” (Heintz [2007]). 
Introduction 
Other university officials are less circumspect than Gutmann when it comes to the finan-
cial implications of family loyalty. The Dean of Admissions at the University of Pennsylvania 
observed, “It fosters more loyalty to Penn, keeps an ongoing interest in Penn among family 
members, helps us in our efforts to raise money and continues to create a wonderful family at-
mosphere” (Heintz [2007]). In a similar vein, a member of the Rice University public relations 
staff said, “Any development professional will testify that a family's financial commitment is 
likely to grow with additional members’ and generations’ common affiliation” (Thomas and 
Shepard [2003]). Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel of the American Council on Education, 
went so far as to say that “without legacy preference, there would be a significant decrease in 
giving from a core body of traditional support — families in which at least a second generation 
has gone to the institution” (Golden [2003]).  
Are these financial benefits real? Alumni do increase their giving when their children ap-
proach college age, and increase their giving yet more when their children are admitted (Meer 
and Rosen [2009]). But the claims that legacy admissions bond families to a university go well 2 
 
beyond this, with giving affected by the alumni status of other relatives as well. Whether such a 
phenomenon actually exists has not received much exploration. Lara and Johnson [2008] and 
Holmes [2009] each examine donative behavior at small liberal arts schools, and include as an 
explanatory variable the number of relatives who attended the college. Both find that, other 
things being the same, the probability of making a gift increases with the number of relatives 
who attended the college, as does the amount of the gift, conditional on giving. While useful, this 
finding leaves open an important question: Do some family relationships matter more than oth-
ers? In particular, are the impacts greatest when the family member is from an earlier generation 
(such as a parent, aunt or uncle, or grandparent), the current generation (a sibling or cousin), or 
from the succeeding generation (a child, niece, or nephew)? 
This paper uses a unique data set to estimate how alumni contributions to a selective re-
search university are affected by the alumni status of the members of their family. The proprie-
tary data provided by this university, henceforth referred to as Anon U, contain detailed informa-
tion about donations made by alumni as well as a variety of their economic and demographic 
characteristics. In particular, we know all members of the alumnus’s family who attended Anon 
U, including in-laws. Section 2 describes the data and econometric framework. The results are 
presented in Section 3. We find that the type of relative who attended the university has a strong 
effect on an alumnus or alumna’s giving behavior, ceteris paribus. In particular, the effects of 
attendance by members of the younger generation (children, children-in-law, nieces and ne-
phews) are greater than the effects of attendance by the older generations (parents, parents-in-
law, aunts and uncles). Section 4 discusses the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifica-
tions of the model. The results are robust to the exclusion of outliers and do not differ for male 
and female alumni. Section 5 concludes with a summary and suggestions for future research. 3 
 
 
2. Data and Econometric Framework 
Our primary data source is the administrative archives of Anon U’s Development Office, 
which contain information on all alumni donations from 1983 to 2007. The data are proprietary 
and sensitive, and individuals’ names were stripped from the records before being made availa-
ble to us. Each individual has his or her relatives’ identification numbers and relation types 
listed. 
2.1 Data 
Our unit of observation is a yearly giving opportunity. For example, if an individual has 
been an alumna for 5 years, she accounts for 5 giving opportunities in our analysis, starting in the 
first fiscal year after graduation. Multiple gifts for the same purpose in the same year are 
summed together. The Development Office data also include information on academic major, the 
alumnus’s  undergraduate  extracurricular activities, post graduate education, occupation, resi-
dence, and whether he or she is married to another graduate of Anon U. Anon U’s Registrar sup-
plemented these data with information on SAT scores, academic honors, ethnicity, type of high 
school, summary evaluations made by the Admissions Office during the application process, and 
grade point average. The Registrar’s data are available only for the classes of 1972 to 2005, so 
we restrict our analysis to this group of individuals.  
As noted above, previous research has documented that the presence of a family member 
who attended a university increases an alumnus’s giving to that institution. This is true in our 
data as well. For example, among alumni with family members who attended Anon U, the pro-
portion who make a gift in a given year is 0.639, while for those who did not, it is 0.507. The 
conditional mean donation is $1114 for those who had a family member attend, and $837 for 
those who did not. These tendencies continue to be present even after taking into account other 4 
 
variables that might affect giving.
1 Our focus, however, is not on the effect of having some rela-
tive(s) who attended the university, but on the comparative impacts of different types of family 
relationships. Therefore, our analysis sample includes only alumni who had at least one family 
member who attended Anon U.
2
An immediate issue is how to characterize the extent to which an alumnus’s family is 
connected with Anon U. One possibility is simply to add up the number of family members who 
have attended, but this does not allow us to distinguish among the effects of different types of 
family relationships. We instead include a series of dichotomous variables each of which takes a 
value of one if the alumnus had a relative in that category who attended Anon U: spouse, sibling, 
child, parent, cousin, aunt or uncle, great-uncle, grandfather, niece or nephew, parent-in-law, 
sibling-in-law, or another in-law.
 This gives us 222,838 observations, representing 13,170 alum-
ni. We delete 10,300 observations because of missing or unreliable data on covariates. This 
leaves 212,538 observations on 12,646 alumni. As indicated at the top of Table 1, of these obser-
vations, the proportion associated with a gift is 0.639 (s.d. = 0.480), and the mean gift condition-
al on making a gift is $1,114 (s.d. = $27,738). 
3 An individual is characterized as having a given type of rela-
tive when the relative matriculates at Anon U, rather than when he or she graduates, and relatives 
are drawn from members of all graduating classes between 1900 and 2012.
4
                                                 
1 In regressions that include the right hand side variables listed in Table 1, the marginal effect of a relative who at-
tended Anon U on the probability of making a donation is 0.101 (s.e. = 0.0043) and the proportional effect on the 
amount given, conditional on making a gift, is 0.0429 (s.e. = 0.0139).  
2 More technically, if alumni without relatives were in the sample, then the reference group for each relation would 
consist of those with no alumni relatives at all and those with some other type of relative. It would be difficult to 
interpret such results.  
3 Anon U began did not begin admitting women until the 1960s. Consequently, we have grandfathers and great-
uncles in our sample, but no grandmothers or great-aunts. The “other in-law” category is relatively small and in-
cludes cousins, grandparents, aunts and uncles, and nieces and nephews-in-law. 
 The means of these 
dichotomous variables are reported in Table 1. 
4 Our data indicate whether an individual was ever married to a fellow alumnus of Anon U, but information about 
when the marriage took place is spotty In effect, then, the spouse and in-law variables measure whether the individ-5 
 
Conditional on having any relative who attended Anon U, the mean number of relatives 
is 2.2. Conditional on having a relative of a given type who attended Anon U, the modal number 
of relatives of that type is one. For example, of the alumni whose siblings attended Anon U, 81 
percent of them had only one sibling who did so. The comparable figures for children-in-law and 
siblings-in-law were 85 percent and 83 percent, respectively.
5  
Previous empirical work on the determinants of giving suggests that variables can have 
different effects on the decision whether or not to donate — the extensive margin — than on the 
decision how much to donate, conditional on making a gift — the intensive margin.
2.2 Econometric Specification 
6
It is straightforward to use the estimates from these two steps to calculate unconditional 
marginal effects on the mean level of giving; this allows us to characterize the effect of family 
relationships on giving taking into account both the impacts on the intensive and extensive mar-
 A statistical 
model that allows for this possibility is therefore needed. We assume that each alumnus first 
chooses whether or not to make a gift and then, conditional on making a gift, decides how much 
to donate. Following Huck and Rasul [2007], a natural specification is a hurdle model. In our 
context, the first step in the implementation of the hurdle model is to estimate a probit for wheth-
er or not the individual makes a gift. The second step is to use ordinary least squares on the posi-
tive observations to analyze the decision about how much to give. An assumption is needed to 
make causal inferences from the second-stage estimates, namely, that the second stage is condi-
tionally independent of the first. We discuss this further below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ual ever had that type of relative. Section 4 shows that it is unlikely that this limitation in the data affects our subs-
tantive results. 
5 Not surprisingly, then, when we estimated a model in which each variable was the number of relatives in each cat-
egory, we found that there was little difference in our substantive results. 
6 Thus, for example, it would not be appropriate to use a Tobit model, which imposes the constraint that the margin-
al effect of a given variable on the probability of giving and the marginal effect on the amount given are the same up 




As is typically the case, a few relatively large gifts account for a disproportionate amount 
of Anon U’s donations. For example, in our analysis sample, the top one percent of gifts in 2007 
accounted for 81.6 percent of total giving. These large gifts are critical to the university, so it is 
important to determine whether family bonding affects the likelihood of such gifts. We therefore 
also use a probit model to estimate the probability that the alumnus is a “class leader” in a given 
year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or 
equal to the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class.  
 We correct for correlation among the error terms for any given individual with a clustering 
procedure in both the probit and OLS models. We also clustered on families rather than individ-
uals and found that this had only a negligible effect on the standard errors. 
An alternative two-step procedure, suggested by Heckman [1979], can also be used to es-
timate the amount of giving, conditional on it being positive. Heckman’s model augments the 
OLS equation in the second stage with the inverse Mills ratio. There is some controversy in the 
literature with respect to which estimator is superior (Leung and Yu [1996]); hence, a sensible 
approach is to estimate the model both ways. We show below that our substantive results are es-
sentially unchanged when we use Heckman’s method. 
In addition to the family relationship variables in Table 1, we include on the right hand 
side a series of variables that has been shown in previous studies to exert an important influence 
on alumni giving (Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano [2002], Shulman and Bowen [2001], Lara and 
Johnson [2008], Holmes [2009]). These include years since graduation, gender, ethnicity, SAT 
scores, ranking of the candidate by the admissions office when they applied to Anon U, course of 
                                                 
7 Denote the amount of giving as Y, and the vector of right hand side variables as X. Then the first stage of the esti-
mation gives results for Pr[Y>0|X] and the second stage gives E[Y|X,Y>0]. The unconditional value of giving, 
E[Y|X], is Pr[Y>0|X]*E[Y|X,Y>0]. The marginal effects, ∂E[Y|X]/∂X, are straightforward to compute, and standard 
errors are obtained using the delta method. 7 
 
study, and post-baccalaureate education. The literature also shows that giving is heavily influ-
enced by the affinity that alumni develop for their schools as undergraduates. Participation in 
varsity sports and membership in fraternities and sororities are two ways in which such affinities 
develop (Clotfelter [2001], Monks [2003]); we include variables relating to these activities. The 
model also includes time effects, class effects, and location effects. The year effects reflect the 
impacts of the business cycle, the stock market, and so on.
8 The year effects also account for the 
size of Anon U’s fundraising staff and the amount of its fundraising expenditures, which vary 
from year to year. The class effects control for common influences on alumni in the same class, 
such as the political milieu when they were undergraduates, the presence of certain professors or 
administrators, and so on. 
A final econometric issue relates to the fact that our data contain a few very large out-
liers. For example, there are 12 gifts greater than $1 million in our sample. To address this issue, 
we use the logarithm of the amount of giving on the left hand side of the OLS equation. As an 
additional check to make sure that outliers are not driving our results, we estimate the OLS equa-
tion with the top one percent of the observations eliminated. As shown below, the substantive 
results with respect to the impact of different types of relatives are not affected. 
 
3. 
                                                 
8 Bristol [1991] emphasizes the role of the stock market and Ehrenberg and Smith [2001] document the importance 
of macroeconomic conditions. 
Results 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the marginal effects of the family relationship variables on 
the probability of making a gift. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. In addition to 
the variables listed in the table, the models include the other right hand side variables mentioned 
in the previous section, which are suppressed for brevity. 8 
 
The first entry in this column indicates that alumni with a spouse who attended Anon U 
are 12.3 percentage points more likely to make a gift in a given year than those who did not. The 
next bank of estimates considers relatives who are in the same generation as the alumnus —
siblings, siblings-in-law, and cousins. The magnitudes of the coefficients are small and one can-
not reject the hypothesis that they are zero. Thus, the attendance of relatives in the same genera-
tion at Anon U does not affect the probability of making a gift. The next set of figures looks at 
the impact of relatives in the succeeding generation. Here the findings are rather different. If 
one’s child attended Anon U, the probability of making a gift increases by 12.9  percentage 
points, a child-in-law increases it by 3.99 percentage points, and a niece or nephew increases it 
by 7.4 percentage points. The notion that alumni are more likely to make a donation when their 
children are accepted by their alma mater is widely believed among fundraisers and has been do-
cumented in previous work (Meer and Rosen [2009]). The novel finding here is that other rela-
tives in the next generation also affect giving, and the pattern of the point estimates seems to 
make sense—the matriculation of one’s own child has a bigger impact than nieces and nephews, 
who in turn have a larger effect than children-in-law. 
The next set of estimates examines the impact of relatives in the preceding generation. 
Having a parent, parent-in-law or aunt/uncle who attended Anon U increases the likelihood of 
giving, but the effects are not as large as for relatives in the succeeding generation. The point es-
timates, which are between 1.7 to 3.7 percentage points, are fairly close to each other. The next 
set of numbers, which shows the estimates for grandfathers and great-uncles, indicates that as we 
move another generation earlier the effect on the probability of giving becomes so attenuated that 
it is statistically not discernible from zero. Finally, the “other in-law” estimate indicates that hav-
ing some other in-law relative increases the probability of giving by 4.4 percentage points. This 9 
 
fairly large estimate is difficult to interpret, though, as it represents a relatively small number of 
positive observations and a mix of different relative types. 
Taken together, the results in Column (1) suggest that there is something to the family 
bonding view described at the outset. The kinds of family members who attended this institution 
do affect the likelihood that an alumnus will make a gift. In this context, we think that the sub-
stantial effects for members of the preceding generation are particularly noteworthy. Unlike the 
case of one’s own children, it is highly unlikely that giving to Anon U reflects gratitude for the 
fact that they were accepted to the university. Hence, this finding makes the existence of family 
bonding particularly compelling. 
Column (2) shows OLS estimates of the amount given, conditional on making a gift. To 
interpret the negative coefficient on the spouse variable, note that half the value of gifts from 
married alumni is credited to each individual. Thus, our finding implies that married couples 
jointly choose to give less, conditional on giving, even as the results in column (1) show that 
they are substantially more likely to make a gift. We conjecture that this finding arises because a 
gift to Anon U has public good aspects for couples. Specifically, suppose that a gift generates a 
“warm glow” that is nonrival and nonexcludable. In that case, each spouse derives utility from 
the other spouse’s gift, and the couple gives less jointly than they would have if they were un-
married. Having a sibling who attended Anon U raises the conditional amount given by about 6.1 
percent; otherwise, relatives in the same generation have no statistically significant impact on the 
amount given. In the succeeding generation, a child who attended is associated with about a 48 
percent increase in giving; a child-in-law with a 13 percent increase. The estimate for nieces and 
nephews is positive, but not statistically significant. In the preceding generation, the point esti-
mates for parents-in-law and aunts/uncles are positive and relatively close in magnitude, 6.7 and 10 
 
8.2 percent, respectively. The negative coefficient on the parent variable is not easy to interpret. 
It might indicate that there is some kind of substitution of giving between generations of the nuc-
lear family, but we cannot be sure. As was the case for the probability of giving, having grandfa-
thers and great-uncles who attended Anon U exerts no statistically discernible impact on the 
amount an alumnus donates.  
Column (3) combines the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) to calculate the overall effect 
on the unconditional mean of giving. Unsurprisingly, we find that children, children-in-law, and 
nieces and nephews are associated with higher average gifts. Parents-in-law and aunts and uncles 
are also associated with significantly higher giving, but for parents, the combination of a higher 
propensity to make any gift but a lower gift amount, conditional on giving, results in an insigni-
ficant overall effect on giving. This is consistent with the hypothesis posited above, that individ-
uals substitute their parents’ giving for their own. 
The fourth column of Table 1 shows how each family relationship changes the probabili-
ty that an individual will be a class leader, other things being the same. The results suggest that 
having an Anon U spouse increases the probability of being a class leader by 1.1 percentage 
points. Thus, while the mean amount given by a married couple is lower than what each person 
would have given individually (column (2)), they are more likely to be among the largest givers. 
To put this figure in perspective, recall that, by construction, the probability that a random alum-
nus will be a class leader is only 10 percent. Hence, a 1.1 percentage point increase is substantial. 
Consistent with the results in Columns (1) and (2), the largest effects are for relatives in the next 
generation, with a child having the largest effect (9.8 percentage points) and children-in-law and 
nieces/nephews having effects in the 3 to 5 percentage point range. There is not much of an im-
pact from having relatives in earlier generations who went to Anon U, except for aunts/uncles, 11 
 
for whom the effect is 1.4 percentage points. Taken together, the results in column (4) do not 
lend strong support to the notion that family bonding leads to exceptionally high giving. Alumni 
respond positively when members of the next generation in their families attend Anon U, but 
coming from a family with a tradition of attending the university does not seem to have an im-
pact along this dimension, other things being the same. 
 
4. Alternative Specifications. 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we estimated a number of alternative spe-
cifications of our model. 
Permanent income.
Further, although we lack annual income data, for a large subset of our alumni, we have 
information that is closely related to permanent income, occupation and field. We have these va-
riables for 155,571 observations, representing 8,483 alumni.
 Unfortunately, our data include no direct information on income, an 
important determinant of alumni giving (Shulman and Bowen [2001, p. 404]). To assess the con-
sequences, we begin by noting that a number of the variables in our basic specification also 
proxy for the individual’s permanent or family income, including gender, ethnicity, college ma-
jor and grade point average, advanced degrees, years since graduation, and location. 
9
                                                 
9 Due to lack of reliable data regarding the start- and stop-dates of occupation and field, these variables indicate 
whether the alumnus was ever involved in that field or occupation, rather than whether they are involved during the 
particular year of observation. 
 The proportion of individuals in 
this sample who make a donation is 67.7 percent, somewhat higher than the 63.9 percent figure 
for our basic sample. The summary statistics showing the proportions of the samples in the vari-
ous fields are available upon request. The fields of education, finance, health care and law are 
highly represented. We re-estimate our basic models with this subsample including the occupa-
tion and field data in order to see whether our substantive results are sensitive to their inclusion. 12 
 
To establish a baseline for this exercise, we estimate our model using only the sample of 
alumni for whom we have occupation and position, but without including these variables. These 
results are recorded in Table 3a. A comparison of these estimates with those in Table 2 indicates 
that the behavioral patterns of the individuals in this subsample do not differ substantially from 
those for the sample as a whole. We next augment this model with the occupation and position 
variables; these results are in Table 3b. Comparing Tables 3a and 3b, we see that the addition of 
the field and occupation variables has no substantive impact on the estimates. We conclude that 
it is unlikely that our results with respect to family relationships are being driven by the omission 
of income from our set of right hand side variables. 
This discussion of the role of the alumnus’s income raises a related issue—the possible 
importance of dynastic income. We have interpreted our results in Tables 2 and 3b, particularly 
those relating to impact of having older relatives who attended Anon U, as telling us something 
about family bonding. One might argue that they simply reflect (unobserved) dynastic wealth. 
Certain families, both within and across generations, have more wealth than others, and hence 
have a capacity to give larger gifts. Note, however, that even if this observation is correct, by it-
self it says little about the validity of our estimates. If the concern is that having any relative who 
attended Anon U is associated with greater family wealth, then the fact that our sample consists 
only of individuals with alumni relatives mitigates this problem. Our results may be spurious, 
though, if the type of relative is associated with greater family wealth. For instance, having a 
parent who attended Anon U may be more correlated with dynastic wealth than having a child 
who attended.  
To address this issue, we begin by noting that some of our covariates are likely correlated 
with dynastic income as well as individual income, as above. These include race and an indicator 13 
 
for whether the individual went to a public or private high school. Cunningham and Cochi-
Ficano [2002] point out that SAT scores are closely related to family socioeconomic status as 
well. To the extent that such variables account for dynastic income, the issue is moot. To investi-
gate this issue more systematically, we began by deleting the top one percent of total family giv-
ing observations, working on the premise that these are likely to be the families with particularly 
high wealth. When we estimated the models in Table 2 with this sample, we found that the re-
sults were basically the same. In the same spirit, we deleted the observations from families with 
the one percent highest average gift per family. Again, we found that the results were basically 
unchanged. In short, this admittedly rough attempt to see if differences in dynastic wealth are 
driving our results shows no evidence that they do. 
Removing outliers. As is the case at most universities, a few large gifts account for a dis-
proportionate share of total donations to Anon U. For example, as noted earlier, the top one per-
cent of positive gifts for general purposes in our sample accounted for 81.6 percent of the total in 
2007 This raises the possibility that our results for amounts given are being driven by just a few 
observations. Our use of logs for the left hand side variables attenuates the impact of outliers, but 
as another check, we re-estimate the models for amounts given with the top one percent of dona-
tions in each category deleted from the sample. The results are in Table 4. When we compare 
these results to their counterparts in Table 1, we see that the signs and magnitudes are similar. 
Hence, outliers do not appear to be driving our results. 
Gender differences. Previous empirical research on altruism indicates that the behavior of 
men and women can differ in substantial ways. (See Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001] and Meer 
and Rosen [forthcoming].) This raises the possibility that the impact of family bonding may be 
different for men and women. To address this issue, we interact each of the family relationship 14 
 
variables with an indicator for whether the alumnus is male. The results are reported in Table 5.
10 
None of the interaction terms is statistically significant, and the terms are jointly insignificant. 
On the extensive margin, the interaction terms are jointly significant only at p = 0.29, and on the 
intensive margin, they are significant at p = 0.63. This is consistent with the notion that the im-
pact of having relatives who attended Anon U is no different for men than for women.  
A further question along these lines is whether bonding depends on the gender of the re-
levant relative. For example, is the impact of a cousin relatively greater if the cousin is male or 
female? We address this issue by including a set of variables controlling for the proportion of 
each type of relative that are male. These results, which are available upon request, indicate that 
these controls are neither individually nor jointly significant, and their point estimates are small. 
Further, interacting these variables with the indicator for whether the alumnus is male yields no 
significant results. We therefore conclude that the gender of relatives who attended or attend 
Anon U is irrelevant for the formation of family bonds. 
Indicator for marital status.
                                                 
10 As noted earlier, in our data, half of any gift donated by an individual is credited to the person’s spouse. Hence, it 
makes no sense to interact the gender and spouse variables, so such interactions are not included in this table. 
 As noted above, our data do not provide reliable data with re-
spect to the start date of marriages, which means that in a given year, the indicators for the pres-
ence of spouses and in-laws who attended Anon U may be computed with error. To investigate 
whether this shortcoming is a concern, we begin by assuming that many marriages have taken 
place by the time the alumnus is eight years out of school. Hence, if we estimate our model using 
only observations for which alumni are roughly 30 years of age or older, we have eliminated 
most of the observations for which an alumnus is not yet married to his or her alumnus spouse. 
When we estimated our basic models with this truncated data set, we found that the coefficients 
on the spouse and in-law variables were quite similar to their counterparts when the entire sam-15 
 
ple is used. For instance, the parent-in-law coefficient on the extensive margin was 0.0404 (s.e. = 
0.0161), compared to 0.0365 (s.e. = 0.0137) in Table 2, using the full sample. The coefficient for 
spouse on the intensive margin was -0.129 (s.e. = 0.0335), compared to -0.110 (s.e. = 0.0262) in 
Table 2. While we cannot rule out other interpretations, this finding provides at least some assur-
ance that our results are not an artifact of misclassifications of marital status.  
Alternative econometric specification.
 
 An alternative econometric estimator augments the 
OLS equation for the amount given with the inverse Mills ratio generated by the first stage probit 
(Heckman [1979]). This model explicitly allows for correlation between the errors in the first 
and second stage equations. The econometric literature indicates that the desirability of this esti-
mator relative to the hurdle model is unclear. In particular, Leung and Yu [1996] observe that 
even if the errors in the true model are correlated, the hurdle model may, under certain circums-
tances, yield better estimates. In any case, it seems sensible to re-estimate the model using 
Heckman’s approach to see if the substantive results are affected. They are not. For instance, the 
selection model yields an estimate of the effect of having a spouse who also attended Anon U of 
46.2 percent on the overall amount of the gift and -12.3 percent on the size of the gift, condition-
al on giving one. The results from our basic specification are 47.5 percent and -11.0 percent, re-
spectively. The coefficients on the other variables are similarly close in magnitude. Hence, our 
results are robust with respect to this change in econometric specification. 
6. 
  A spokeswoman for the University of Michigan laid out the case for legacy admissions in 
this way: “When you have families who have a longstanding connection to the university, there 
is a level of engagement that’s of great value to the institution; they’re more likely to give time 
and services, like recruiting and fund-raising” (Bauza [2003]). We use a rich set of data from an 
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anonymous selective research institution to examine whether legacy admissions bind families to 
universities. Specifically, we investigate which types of family members have the most important 
effects in this context. We find that the effects of attendance by members of the younger genera-
tion (children, children-in-law, nieces and nephews) are greater than the effects of attendance by 
the older generations (parents, parents-in-law, aunts and uncles, and grandparents).  In short, 
alumni giving behavior is consistent with the notion that families bond with universities, but 
from the standpoint of stimulating giving, different types of family members have rather differ-
ent effects.  
Our results are based on data from a single selective research university. Consequently, 
one must be cautious about assuming that the results would apply to other institutions as well. 
That said, our findings suggest that university officials need at least to consider the possibility 
that the configuration of family members who have attended the institution can have an impor-







Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Whether Gave  0.639  0.480 
Total Giving in a Year, Conditional on Making a Gift  1,114  27,738 
Spouse  0.346  0.476 
Sibling  0.411  0.492 
Sibling-in-Law  0.109  0.312 
Cousin  0.138  0.345 
Child  0.0120  0.109 
Child-in-Law  0.0284  0.166 
Niece/Nephew  0.00958  0.0974 
Parent  0.380  0.486 
Parent-in-Law  0.0651  0.247 
Aunt/Uncle  0.149  0.356 
Grandfather  0.0899  0.286 
Great-Uncle  0.0382  0.192 
Other In-Law  0.0334  0.180 
 
 
*Other variables included on the right hand side of the basic specification are: years since graduation and its square; an 
indicator for reunion year (multiples of 5 since graduation);  race;  gender;  type of high school;  academic and non-
academic rating by the admissions department; SAT scores; participation in varsity and club athletics while at Anon U; 
college GPA; receipt of academic honors; membership in social organizations; academic major and minor; receipt of an 
athletic, academic, department, or service award from the university; receipt of a graduate scholarship; receipt of an ad-
vanced degree such as a masters, M.B.A., J.D., M.D., or Ph.D.; state and foreign country indicators; year effects; and gra-
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit model and 
using 212,538 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on making a 
gift, using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift,, a total of 135,783 observations. Column (3) 
combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. Column (4) shows the incremental effect of being a “class 
leader” in a given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or equal to 
the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the variables 
listed in the footnote of Table 1. Full results are available on request. 19 
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The figures in this table show the results when the basic models are estimated using only the sample of alumni for whom 
we have information on field and occupation, although the field and occupation variables are not included. Column (1) 
shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit model and using 
155,546 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on making a gift, 
using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift, a total of 105,317 observations. Column (3) com-
bines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. Column (4) shows the incremental effect of being a “class 
leader” in a given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or equal to 
the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class.. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the variables 
listed in the footnote of Table 1. Full results are available on request. 20 
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The figures in this table show the results when the basic models are estimated using only the sample of alumni for whom 
we have information on field and occupation, and the field and occupation variables are included on the right hand side. 
Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit model and 
using 155,546 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on making 
gift, using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift, a total of 105,317 observations. Column (3) 
combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. Column (4) shows the incremental effect of being a “class 
leader” in a given year, where a class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or equal to 
the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or her class. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the variables 
listed in the footnote of Table 1. Full results are available on request. 21 
 
Table 4 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit model and 
using 211,188 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on making 
gift, using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift, a total of 134,433 observations. Column (3) 
combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coeffi-
cients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked 
with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions 
include the variables listed in the footnote of Table 1. Full results are available on request. 22 
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Log Amount  




Total Effect on 
Giving 
(4) 
Probability of  
Being a Class Leader 
 
Probit Model 











































































































































































































This table augments the basic model with a series of interaction terms. Each of the relationship variables is interacted with 
a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the alumnus is a male. Column (1) shows the incremental effects on 
the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit model and using 212,538 observations. Column (2) 
shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on making a gift, using ordinary least squares and 
using observations with a positive gift, a total of 135,783 observations. Column (3) combines these, and shows the mar-
ginal effects on total giving. Column (4) shows the incremental effect of being a “class leader” in a given year, where a 
class leader is defined as an individual who donated an amount greater than or equal to the 90
th percentile of gifts in his or 
her class. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are 
marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on 
individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the variables listed in the footnote of Table 1. Full 
results are available on request. 
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